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Corporate Ethics, Agency, and the Theory
of the Firm

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20021 was enacted as a legislative response to a
wave of corporate scandals. Unlike the Wall Street insider trading scandals of the
late 1980s,2 the crisis at the dawn of the new century concerned the behavior of
managers in Corporate America.3 Their conduct brought to the forefront the role
of agency in the problem of corporate ethics. During the roundtable session dedicated to the problem, several commentators suggested that the theory of the firm
and corporate law do not sufficiently account for the problem.4 This Article is a
continuation of that dialogue.
Let’s start with a metaphor: one cannot fill water in a vessel that does not exist.
This captures the essential problem in thinking about the firm and its ethical obligations. Under the prevailing “nexus of contracts” theory, the corporation as an
independent entity does not exist. The logical end of this idea is dissociation of
corporate law and economic theory from the problem of ethics in corporate action.
Like the concept of the nonexistent firm, corporate ethics is reduced to the ethical
problems and dilemmas of the autonomous person. That being the case, the issue
is a matter of personal philosophy and responsibility, perhaps subject to legal regulation, but not within the ambit of corporate law.
This short Article suggests that the problem of corporate ethics cannot be reduced to an examination of the autonomous person. Although the greatest influence on action and choice is one’s moral constitution, it does not follow that the
agent’s behavior is the same within or without the firm. Ethics is a function of
corporate form. The theory of agency cannot dismiss the firm as a fiction or metaphorical shorthand because that which does not exist should not be able to cause or
influence moral deliberation and action. Thus, the theory of the firm, which em* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; J.D., George Washington
University; M.B.A., University of Pennsylvania (Wharton); B.A., University of Chicago. I thank my colleague
Lisa Fairfax for her comments.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
2. See generally James B. Stewart, Den of Thieves (1991).
3. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Corporate Conduct: The President; Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. Times, July 31, 2002, at A1.
4. Symposium, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Five Years Later: Assessing its Impact, Charting its Future, 3
J. Bus. & Tech. L. 207 (2008).
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phasizes profit and wealth maximization, should incorporate a richer, more realistic account of the economics and ethics of agency.
i.
The problem of corporate ethics is profound. Little needs to be said on the point
that modern corporations wield enormous power, and thus their actions raise ethical issues. Corporations are rivaled only by government, as formal institutions go,
in terms of influence on human welfare.5 Corporate action aggregates the combined efforts of many factors of production. With such concentrated power, the
orbit of harm is broad.6 If the firm’s activity affects only its contractual constituents, the constituents would bargain for the allocation of these costs and reach an
efficient outcome absent impediments to bargaining. But a corporation is not a
closed universe of contracting parties. Corporations impart significant negative externalities on those who are outside the nexus of contracts.7 It is not for want of
imparting harms that corporations take action ending in that result; corporate
agents are influenced by conflicting value systems. The most difficult ethical problem arises when profit conflicts with substantial interests of noncontractual
constituents.
Since the problem of corporate ethics is as undeniable as its influence on social
wealth and welfare, we can fairly ask: does the prevailing theory of the firm account
for the problem? There are two broad conceptions of the firm: the property model
and the entity model.8 Among legal and economics scholarship, the entity model is
the minority position.9 The property conception, having the strongest support in
the academy, is considered the prevailing theory of the firm, and the subject of
5. Liberal (or progressive) commentators have expressed alarm at the scale and growth of corporate
power. See generally Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power
(2004); Noreena Hertz, The Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy
(2003); Marjorie Kelly, The Divine Right of Capital: Dethroning the Corporate Aristocracy (2001);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility: America’s Newest Export (2001).
6. Consider these well known, if not iconic, problems: the Ford Pinto, Royal Dutch/Shell in Nigeria,
Union Carbide in Bhopal, Pfizer’s clinical testing of Trovan in Nigeria, and Google in China, just to name a
few. See Ike Okonta & Oronto Douglas, Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights, and Oil in the
Niger Delta (2001); The Ford Pinto Case (Douglas Birsch & John H. Fielder eds., 1994); Sanjoy Hazarika,
Bhopal Payments by Union Carbide Set at $470 Million, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at A1; Tamar Lewin, Families
Sue Pfizer on Test of Antibiotic, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 2001, at C1; Clive Thompson, Google’s China Problem (and
China’s Google Problem), N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 64.
7. The limited liability shield ensures that a certain amount of aggregate cost under tort law goes uncompensated. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate
Torts, 100 Yale L.J. 1879 (1991); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 Colum. L.
Rev. 1565, 1566, 1617–18 (1991); see also Robert J. Rhee, Tort Arbitrage, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 125, 181–82 (2008)
(arguing that the theory of negligence is inefficient in deterring torts by corporations).
8. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Corporation, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 261, 264–72
(1992).
9. The entity model views the corporation as a social institution, and thus it more comfortably accommodates the idea that firms should have ethical obligations and some responsibility towards the general social
welfare. Id. at 265.
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inquiry here.10 While it is beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the nuances
of the property model, a brief description highlights the problem.
The model finds its roots in Ronald Coase’s theory of the firm. In his seminal
article The Nature of the Firm, Coase asked the basic question: why do firms exist?11
His answer was that firms minimize the transaction cost of the economic activity.12
If an entrepreneur owns all factors of production, there would be no need for a
firm. But, of course, this does not reflect the constraints of the real world. Entrepreneurs need the cooperation of the factors of production, which can be sought
independently or through a firm structure. Without the firm, entrepreneurs would
require a series of contracts, and the contracting cost would be extraordinarily
high.13 Coase’s insight was that the production through a firm structure reduces
this cost.14 Rather than an independent entity, the firm is seen as a market in which
autonomous people contract for their inputs in the pursuit of an enterprise. Thus,
the most important function is the discovery of efficient price.15
Under the property model, the corporation is seen as an aggregate of private
property rights of the firm’s contractual constituents.16 Rather than an entity of
independent social and economic significance, the corporation is said to be a
“nexus of contracts.”17 Economists have argued that the firm “is simply one form of
legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also
characterized by the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash
flows of the organization which can generally be sold without permission of the
other contracting individuals.”18 The nexus of contracts is a metaphor for joint

10. The property conception of the firm has strong support from academics, activist investors, and increasingly directors, while the entity theory of the firm has support from corporate managers and directors,
and less support in the academy. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great
Takeover Debate: A Mediation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1067, 1075–76 (2002).
11. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 390 (1937).
12. Id. at 390–93.
13. See id. at 391.
14. See id. (“A factor of production (or the owner thereof) does not have to make a series of contracts with
the factors with whom he is co-operating within the firm, as would be necessary, of course, if this co-operation
were as a direct result of the working of the price mechanism. For this series of contracts is substituted one.”
(emphasis added)).
15. See id. at 390 (“The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a
cost of using the price mechanism. The most obvious cost of ‘organising’ production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are.”).
16. Allen, supra note 8, at 264–65.
17. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 12
(1991).
18. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 311 (1976). According to the contract theory, corporate law can be
seen “as a standard-form contract, supplying terms most venturers would have chosen but yielding to explicit
terms in all but a few instances.” Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 15. The nexus of contracts theory
has many supporters in the legal academy. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder
Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1423, 1427 (1993) (“[T]he firm
is treated not as a thing, but rather as a nexus or web of explicit and implicit contracts establishing rights and
obligations among the various inputs making up the firm.”).
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production through express and implied contractual arrangements that aggregate
assets to generate cashflow and that define each constituent’s respective property
interest therein. In this arrangement, shareholders hold the claim on the residual
assets and cashflow. Since shareholders are last in line, they have the greatest incentive to see that the corporation makes a profit. While no one technically “owns” the
corporation (for a nexus of contracts is incapable of ownership), shareholders are
seen as residual risk bearers and thus in effect have a financial interest in the firm
akin to the owner of a business.19 Accordingly, the relationship between a shareholder and manager can be analogized to that of a principal and agent, though
technically they do not stand in such a legal relationship.20
The theory of agency supports the nexus of contracts argument and the profit
maximization norm.21 Corporate agents, it is argued, owe an obligation to maximize shareholder profit.22 The corporation is a wealth producing structure. Society
should conscript the firm’s strength, its tendency to maximize wealth.23 If society
wishes to maximize social welfare and the corporation’s activity is inconsistent with
this goal, it can change the price structure instead by penalizing or taxing the activity to provide efficient deterrence.24 But society should not change the structure of
19. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 36–39; see also Allen, supra note 8, at 265 n.7 (explaining
that shareholders can be seen as owners of the firm).
20. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 18, at 308. There is an inherent problem with the application of the
principal-agent dichotomy to the corporation. The managers, broadly defined as the board of directors and
officers, are not agents of the shareholders qua owners of the firm. Shareholders do not have the ability to
direct their “agents.” Easterbrook and Fischel reworked this awkward concept of principal-agent in a way that
makes the legal argument more palatable. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J. Corp. L. 719, 725 (2006). See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 17. But ultimately the “claim that shareholders are ‘principals’ and directors are ‘agents’ contradicts the
realities of corporate law.” Blair & Stout, supra, at 728; see William W. Bratton, Confronting the Ethical Case
Against the Ethical Case for Constituency Rights, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1449, 1450 (1993) (“The agency
concept may be only a metaphor at bottom, but theory of the firm discussants treat it as if it were a component
in a production model.”). This Article uncritically accepts the principal-agent metaphor for the purpose of
maintaining a consistency of terminology with the economic model of the firm.
21. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 9–15.
22. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 439,
439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive
to increase long-term shareholder value.”).
23. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 38.
24. “Far better to alter incentives by establishing rules that attach prices to acts (such as pollution and
layoffs) while leaving managers free to maximize the wealth of the residual claimants subject to the social
constraints.” Id. at 38; see Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2063, 2065 (2001) (“[A] stakeholder measure of managerial accountability could leave
managers so much discretion that managers could easily pursue their own agenda, one that might maximize
neither shareholder, employee, consumer, nor national wealth, but only their own.”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and
Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1189, 1200 (2002) (“[S]hareholder primacy
is a second-best solution that is good for all the stakeholders in the firm, because it limits what might otherwise
be the runaway agency costs that might be incurred by all if directors were not held to a clear and easily
observed metric of good corporate governance.”); see also Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 10, at 1074–75
(describing the reason for shareholder primacy). This idea is rooted in classical economics. Adam Smith made
the famous observation: “By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to
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the firm in a way that it is less apt to maximize wealth; the agent must be incentivized to advance the shareholder’s interest for a manager cannot effectively serve
two or more constituencies whose interests may conflict. A clear charge to the agent
minimizes agency cost, which maximizes the value of the firm.25 Any claim for
injury by one outside the nexus of contracts must “lie outside of corporate law.”26
Thus, corporate law is enabling, and should not be seen as regulatory.27
The nexus of contracts model is a cogent, internally coherent explanation of the
firm. The theory, however, is not without controversy. Like many great scientific
discoveries (and false claims of discovery), the theory requires a suspension of one’s
ordinary perception of the world. The nonintuitive assertion here is that under this
theory “the corporation tends to disappear, transformed from a substantial institution into just a relatively stable corner of the market in which autonomous property owners freely contract.”28 The corporation as a “person” is a “weak and
unimportant fiction.”29 An independently significant entity does not reflect reality.30 “Corporations, we are told, do not really exist; when we refer to one—General
Motors or RJR Nabisco, for example—we are just using a rhetorical shortcut to
refer to the vast network of contracts or implicit contracts that is the ‘reality.’”31
This view reduces all essential aspects of the corporate enterprise to the actions,
choices, and contractual arrangements of the autonomous person. In an argument
that oddly mirrors a well-known shibboleth of the gun lobby,32 we are told that
“firms do not do things; people do things.”33 A nexus of contracts is no more capable of having moral conscience or ethical obligation than a machine, a nexus of
materials, is capable of having a soul.
The property conception of the firm is problematic in theorizing the relationship
between the ethical obligation of the firm and its agents. The presupposition here is
not reification of the firm. One should not anthropomorphize the firm to argue
trade for the public good.” Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations 485 (Regnery Publ’g, Inc. 1998) (1896).
25. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 38; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 22, at 442
(“[T]he most efficacious legal mechanisms for protecting the interests of nonshareholder constituencies—or at
least all constituencies other than creditors—lie outside of corporate law.”).
26. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 22, at 442.
27. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 14.
28. Allen, supra note 8, at 265.
29. William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1395, 1400
(1993). “[T]he personalization of the firm implied by asking questions such as ‘what should be the objective
function of the firm’, or ‘does the firm have a social responsibility’ is seriously misleading. The firm is not an
individual.” Jensen & Meckling, supra note 18, at 311.
30. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 12.
31. Allen, supra note 29, at 1401.
32. Bruce E.H. Johnson & Ambika K. Doran, Amendment XXVIII? Defending Corporate Speech Rights, 58
S.C. L. Rev. 855, 861 (2007) (noting the similarity of attribution of corporate action to the gun lobby’s slogan
“guns don’t kill people, people kill people”).
33. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 Pepp. L. Rev. 971, 971
n.1 (1992); see also G. Mitu Gulati, William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. Rev.
887, 891 (2000) (“[I]t is dangerous to ignore the reality that firms can transact only through individuals . . . .”).
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moral agency.34 This is not only conceded, but embraced. The problem of corporate ethics should focus on the behavior of the agents, but such examination is not
without context. The inquiry is whether the corporate form explains in part an
agent’s ethical deviance.
The problem of corporate ethics can be restated as an economic account of how
agents act on behalf of the firm. A central argument in the theory of the firm is the
existence of an agency relationship between shareholder and manager. Economists
note that there is no perfect agent.35 Without a firm, a person acts on only his
preferences and in most cases we presume that his actions are motivated by a desire
to maximize his utility.36 Within a firm, however, an agent is subject to conflicts,
perceived or real, between his preferences and those of his principal’s.37 This problem can be as mundane as the slacking employee, or as significant as the disloyal
corporate officer. Given this truth, the idea explored here is a simple one: in confronting an ethical dilemma, an agent tends to behave differently when acting
within and without the firm, and thus the problem of corporate ethics and its
connection to the theory of the firm cannot be reduced to the choices of autonomous moral agents, but instead must include a consideration of the corporate
form. If so, the problem of corporate ethics is inextricably tied to the corporate
form itself, which leaves open the question whether the corporate law should have a
role that is beyond strictly enabling.
ii.
Corporate law scholarship on the theory of the firm follows the lead of economists
and focuses much attention on the theory of agency. Many years ago, Adolf Berle
and Gardiner Means observed that the corporation separates ownership from control.38 A divergence of interest between principal and agent creates agency cost,
defined as the sum of the contracting cost, monitoring cost by the principal, the
bonding cost by the agent, and residual loss.39 Immediately pertinent to the issue of
corporate ethics is residual loss, the principal’s reduction in profit (wealth) due to
34. See David Luban, Alan Strudler & David Wasserman, Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90
Mich. L. Rev. 2348, 2368 (1992) (arguing that organizations are not moral persons). But see Peter A. French,
The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 Am. Phil. Q. 207 (1979) (arguing that corporations should be treated as
full members of the moral community and have equal rights and duties as all moral persons).
35. See Michael C. Jensen, A Theory of the Firm 5 (2000) (“[P]eople will not act in the interests of
others (their principals or partners) to the exclusion of their own preferences.”).
36. See id.
37. See Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52 Buff. L. Rev. 727, 727–28
(2004).
38. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 4
(1933).
39. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 18, at 308. Monitoring cost is the expenditure to monitor the agent,
such as the cost of audit systems and outside advisers. Bonding cost is a payment to the agent to expend
resources to protect against the risk of an agent’s deviation from the principal’s interest. These costs include
contractual guarantees to have accounts audited and contractual limitations on an agent’s power to manage. Id.
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an agent’s deviance from the principal’s interest.40 In the extreme case, it can lead
to the ruin of firms, such as Enron.41 Two characteristics of residual loss are worth
noting. First, it is unidirectional in that loss, but not profit, is a cost. This seems
intuitive enough for it would be odd to consider profit a form of cost to shareholders. Second, the cost is equivalent to a disutility because shareholders are typically
uninformed and disengaged from management and they receive benefit (utility)
from corporate profit. On the surface, these propositions seem quite sensible and
they are, for the most part. The idea of agency cost and the shareholder primacy
norm are complementary: agency cost is inimical to profit, which in turn advances
the principal’s interest. And, herein is a continuing source of controversy. “It is the
further step taken by the law and economics theorists, their attempts to forge an
equivalence between rationality and profit maximization, that does give rise to
warm disagreement.”42
The problem of corporate ethics can be examined from the perspective of agency
cost. Start from the premise that ethical dilemmas, by definition, are never easy
because action typically requires selection of conflicting values. Profit, as an attribute in the abstract, is always a good thing, but it exists always in relation to cost,
internalized or externalized. In a competitive world, profit is limited and an ethical
dilemma presents a choice of profit and some other value. Inconsistency with profit
maximization need not entail asset diversion for self-interest, the typical case of
theft or disloyalty by the agent.43 Cases like Enron are easy from this standpoint.
The most difficult ethical problems arise when the agent acts on behalf of the
principal.
We can give tangible context to this discussion. Assume a classic cost-benefit,
tort problem. The firm has a choice of either installing a safety feature with a
manufacturing cost of a, or accepting the inevitable liability, including diminishment of goodwill, with a cost of b, where the manufacturing cost is greater than the
liability cost (a > b). Given the actuarial data, the firm is on notice that more
people will die without the safety precaution. The profit from both choices is expected to exceed the cost of capital, and thus the project is economically profitable.44 The only question is the quantum of profit. Given the choice, the manager
installs the safety feature based on her consideration that lives are worth more than
incremental profit.

40. Id. The suggestion is not that the other components of agency cost are irrelevant. They are not, but a
discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
41. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 Bus. Law.
1403 (2002) (discussing Enron management’s failure to properly oversee its firm).
42. Allen, supra note 29, at 1405.
43. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 10 (“Sometimes this division of interests will lead the
employee to divert the firm’s assets to himself. Theft is the dramatic way to do this; diversion of ‘corporate
opportunities’ may be another . . . .”).
44. See generally G. Bennett Stewart, III, The Quest for Value: A Guide for Senior Managers
(1991).
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The manager’s choice can be seen in two lights. One view is that the agent acted
based on her personal ethical mores. The motive, however characterized (selfish or
selfless), is irrelevant. The economist would say that the manager chose the action
because she derived utility from pursing her vision of a social good; the key inquiry
is the deviation from the principal’s interest, which is presumed to be wealth. Foregone profit can be seen as residual loss since the agent’s preference was given priority over the incremental profit opportunity. If the moral constraint was so great,
she had the option to resign, but barring this dramatic action, she must give fidelity
to the job description. The failure to maintain this fidelity resulted in residual loss.
An alternative view is that the agent acted based on her best guess of the prevailing ethical preference of shareholders. Rather than rely on a default standard of
wealth maximization, the agent acted consistently with what shareholders would
have done if they had been fully informed and given the choice of action. The
characterization of profit sacrifice (residual loss) as an agency cost is inaccurate
since fidelity is the determinative inquiry. Ethically, this is indistinguishable from
the situation where a principal instructs the agent to deliver his property to a social
cause or to mitigate the harm at the cost of profit. Economically, however, there is
a complicating factor arising from the firm structure. The agent cannot ascertain
the principal’s actual preference.
As a theoretical matter, the “principal,” just like the “firm” (it is said), does not
exist, as it is an aggregation of many shareholders with heterogeneous preferences
and ethical standards. Shareholders conflict in matters of profit, strategy and values.45 Not only do shareholders differ in the selection of conflicting value, but they
differ in the manner in which value is maximized.46 As Easterbrook and Fischel
warned, we must be careful in ascribing too much into shorthand metaphors for
45. See Jonathan Macey, The Nature of Conflicts of Interest Within the Firm, 31 J. Corp. L. 613 (2006). The
problem of inter-shareholder conflict, as Macey noted, is seen in High River L.P. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., 353
F. Supp. 2d 487 (M.D. Pa. 2005). There, Mylan made a bid for King Pharmaceutical at a price of $16 per share.
Even after this bid, King shares traded substantially below the bid price at $12 per share. Complaint at 3, High
River L.P. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 487 (M.D. Pa. 2005). Several major shareholders of Mylan
thought that the bid price was too high and attempted to block the deal. Subsequently, a hedge fund, Perry,
bought a stake in King at $12 per share. Id. If the takeover was successful at $16 per share, it would profit $26
million. Id. To influence this result, it also bought 9.9% of shares in Mylan with the intent to vote these shares
in favor of the deal. Id. To hedge the exposure to Mylan stock, Perry sold short the same amount of Mylan
stock. Id. The effect of the simultaneous purchase and shorting of the Mylan stock was to give Perry votes in
Mylan without being exposed to Mylan’s financial risk. Id. The hedging and voting buying strategy created an
obvious divergence of interest among Perry and other shareholders in Mylan who were exposed to its financial
risk. Id. Aside from this dramatic example of inter-shareholder conflict, we can easily imagine the different
agendas and values of shareholders who are institutions, hedge funds, social activists, financial activists, management insiders, entrepreneurs, families, and individuals.
46. Concepts like profit or value maximization cannot be transformed into a legal duty because they
cannot tell us how to act or what action should be taken. “[V]alue maximizing says nothing about how to
create a superior vision or strategy. And value maximizing says nothing to employees or managers about how
to find or establish initiatives or ventures that create value. It only tells us how we will measure success in
activity.” Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 12
Bus. Ethics Q. 235, 245 (2002).
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groups of autonomous individuals with different sets of priorities and preferences.47 That shareholders invest to earn a return is apparent, but this obvious fact
does not support the proposition that we can ascertain an order of preference consistent with a singular view of the principal-shareholder in a decisional context
requiring such ordering.48
Let’s discard the theoretical problem and assume that the collective shareholders
can fairly be categorized into a single principal and that wealth, quite correctly, is
the reason for the investment in the firm. There is still a practical problem. The
conflict between profit and ethics can be restated as one of high transaction cost of
the intermediation structure. It would be inordinately costly to pose complex questions of rank ordering preferences on shareholders in the course of recurring, difficult management decisions. In the above cost-benefit example, consider the
procedures and effort required for principals to make an informed decision based
on the shareholders’ moral standard. Given the problem of ascertaining the actual
preference, the conception of the firm can adopt two approaches. It can either
incorporate a mechanism whereby an agent is allowed to make a best guess as to
what the prevailing preference would be if the principals could hypothetically express their wishes, or it can assume a narrow view of that preference.
The profit maximization norm is really a theory of approximation, an assessment that shareholders are rational wealth maximizers. This assessment of the person must be distinguished from the reason for investment in the firm, which is
obviously a financial return. The approximation can be seen as efficient because it
eliminates the information cost that would be associated with discovering the actual preference of the principals in most cases. The shareholder primacy norm can
be seen, much like corporate law itself, as a default standard that encompasses the
correct contract term in most cases if the relevant parties could have bargained for

47. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 12. Easterbrook and Fischel’s comparison of the corporation and the government is informative. They argued:
It is meaningful to speak of the legislative branch of the U.S. Government, or Congress, or of the
House, or of a committee of the Senate, or of members of Congress, depending on context, but it
would be misleading to think of Congress—an entity with a name—only as an entity, or to believe
that its status as an entity is the most significant thing about the institution. “Congress” is a collective
noun for a group of independent political actors and their employees, and it acts as an entity only
when certain forms have been followed (such as majority approval in each house). So too with
corporations.
Id. Picking up where this argument left off, it would be convenient to characterize all Congressmen as having
the singular motive of serving the public interest. But this proposition, even if true, does not yield a predictive
model of collective behavior in the pursuit of the public interest. The same is true for the collective group of
shareholders. We can note in shorthand that shareholders pursue profit, but this says little about how they
would behave when a particular circumstance requires the rank ordering of preferences towards particular
actions and their expected outcomes.
48. Leo Strine argued the point through a hypothetical in which the shareholder has decided to sell the
company and must select between tradeoffs in offered price and job protection concessions for employees. Leo
E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and Stockholders in Change of Control Transactions:
Is There Any “There” There?, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1169, 1177–83 (2002).
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the choice under condition of zero transaction cost. This argument, however, is far
from self-evident in the circumstance of an ethical dilemma. No rational person
invests in the market to lose money or to contribute to the social cause in any
significant way, and so the profit maximization norm covers a vast swath of corporate action without controversy. But it is controversy that gives rise to hard ethical
dilemmas. A view of the shareholder or owner as ordinarily socialized would produce a different norm of conduct. This is seen when the corporate form is disintermediated from personal deliberation.
Assume the above cost-benefit hypothetical in the context of an entrepreneur
owned enterprise. The entrepreneur possesses an ordinary moral constitution.
Confronted with the essential choice of dollars or lives, many owners would forego
profit. No doubt that many would also select the opposite.49 The point is not diminished that this choice would be much harder for a person of ordinary moral
constitution if she would be singularly accountable based on a direct causality between action and injury. When there is a substantial value at stake, such as life,
liberty or dignity, the act of accommodation is ordinary and comports with empirical observation of how people actually behave.50 There may be nothing heroic or
saintly about relinquishing profit. In the single owner context, a person would not
want to be held morally accountable for personal injuries, destruction of environment, economic support of repressive regimes, deplorable work conditions, etc.51 It
is neither here nor there that this aversion to moral accountability can be explained
in economic terms (i.e., the pursuit of one’s utility). As an approximation, the
profit maximization norm is not the most accurate default standard in circumstances presenting difficult moral dilemmas.
Moreover, the theory of agency cost, a foundational concept in the property
theory of the firm, is not based on wealth maximization. Its authors, Michael Jensen and William Meckling, argued that an entrepreneur owner of a firm will maximize her utility, which may be pecuniary or non-pecuniary, such as “love” or

49. Some have argued that sole owners could be more prone to unethical behavior than shareholders, who
hold diversified portfolios of investments. Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1431, 1445–46 (2006). This argument, however, is problematic. Shareholders
do not control the corporation in its day-to-day affairs, and thus are operationally removed from the decisionmaking processes that typically involve an ethical choice. In thinking about the problem of corporate ethics, we
should focus on the behavior of agents vis-à-vis shareholders. As discussed in this Article, shareholder preference should be relevant under a principal-agent framework. In this regard, if it is true that shareholders would
behave more ethically than a sole owner, a contestable point, the agent should consider it when confronted
with an ethical dilemma. This, then, creates a tension with the shareholder profit maximization norm. As
discussed in Part III, the problem is that the corporate form creates a temporal, spatial and relational distance
between action and consequence. See infra Section III (discussing the works of philosophers, psychologists, and
legal scholars on this concept).
50. For example, while the law does not impose a general duty to rescue people in distress under tort law
or criminal law, many people engage in such rescue to their peril. See, e.g., Eckert v. Long Island R.R. Co., 43
N.Y. 502, 503–04 (1871) (involving a plaintiff that was killed while rescuing a boy from defendant’s train
tracks).
51. See infra Part III.
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“respect.”52 The rational self-interested person is frequently misinterpreted to mean
pathological selfishness with no leeway in preference for the well-being of others.53
But the assumption of a rational person simply connotes the idea that people are
not perfect agents.54 The distinction between wealth and utility maximization in
the theory of agency cost is significant. A utility maximizing single owner may, and
probably would, make allowances for profit sacrifice in furtherance of human welfare directly connected to the entrepreneur’s activity.55 Sacrifice, rescue, accommodation and compromise are empirically observed facts. Given this reality, profit
may constitute an agency cost in the circumstance where it would have been sacrificed had there been a hypothetical, costless dialogue between an agent and an
informed principal.56 If the assumption of a rational person is relaxed to that of a
reasonable person having an ordinary moral constitution, the choice of profit
would certainly be conditional.57
These tensions explain the vigorous debate concerning the ultimate purpose of a
corporation.58 Profit is said to be the corporate end. But, in the context of assessing
a corporate ethical dilemma, this proposition simply begs the question. No serious
person disputes that profit, as a proxy for value creation, is one of the most important attributes of operating a firm, but this is not to say that there is not a serious
question on whether profit maximization is conditional.59 Beneath the economic
superstructure of corporate law percolates “contestable philosophical or political
presuppositions.”60 Since profit is not costless and some cost is externalized in a

52. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 18, at 312.
53. Jensen, supra note 35, at 5.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., id. (theorizing that even Mother Teresa would choose to help raise money for the impoverished citizens of Calcutta rather than accept an invitation to help raise funds for an organization that she
shared little interest in, such as the Boston Symphony Orchestra).
56. Indeed, Easterbrook and Fischel argued that, consistent with the Coase Theorem, “corporate law
should contain the terms people would have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arm’s length for every
contingency sufficiently low.” Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 15.
57. The American Law Institute takes the position that “certain kinds of conduct must or may be pursued
. . . even if the conduct either yields no economic return or entails a net economic loss[)].” Am. Law Inst.,
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 2.01 cmt. f (1994).
58. This debate is a hoary one. Compare A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L.
Rev. 1049, 1049 (1931) (stating that corporate agents exercise power “only for the ratable benefit of all the
shareholders as their interest appears”), with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?,
45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1148 (1932) (stating that a corporation “has a social service as well as a profit-making
function”).
59. Even Milton Friedman argued that profit maximization is conditional as to deception and fraud.
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6
(Magazine); see Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 133 (40th Ann. ed., Univ. of Chicago Press
2002) (1962).
60. Allen, supra note 29, at 1395.
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way that could not have been bargained for, explicitly or implicitly, wealth maximization must have a “political-moral component.”61
Consider the following scenario: a corporation is faced with a choice of selling
state-of-the-art technology to a repressive regime with the reasonable foresight that
such technology will be used to engage in the violation of human rights, and such a
sale is not a violation of the law.62 Clearly, the corporate agent can forego this profit
opportunity without legal consequence.63 Such decision could easily be justified as
being not in the longterm interest of shareholders or posing too great of reputational risk, or perhaps that such a transaction is inconsistent with the core values of
the firm. The rationalization would imply at least a tradeoff between present profit
and some future benefit, and so long as this nexus is present, however abstract or
unformulated, courts conveniently avoid any serious analysis of the cost-benefit.64
But assume the choice is one of profit sacrifice without any basis to rationalize a
future pecuniary benefit. The question is really: should profit be foregone? A legal
duty or economic norm to maximize shareholder profit enjoys the benefit of simplicity, but it also runs into the problem of an inability to avoid in principle morally repugnant actions. Certainly, one option is a “ruthlessly narrow focus,”65 an
argument that the corporation should “make as much money as possible while
confirming to the basic rules of the society.”66 This simple view is not without
precedent. In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,67 the Michigan Supreme Court said, “[a]
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the

61. See id. at 1405 (“Thus, either a descriptive account or a normative account of corporation law that I
might advance would include a powerful element of wealth maximization, but it would inescapably include as
well a political-moral component.”).
62. See, e.g., Edwin Black, IBM and the Holocaust (Three Rivers Press 2002) (2001) (charging that
IBM knowingly provided crucial technology that was used by Nazi Germany to execute the Holocaust). But see
Press Release, IBM, IBM Statement on Nazi-era Book and Lawsuit (Feb. 14, 2001), available at http://www03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/1388.wss (acknowledging that IBM’s equipment was used by Nazi Germany, but that “IBM does not have much information about this period”); Press Release, IBM, Addendum to
IBM Statement on Nazi-era Book and Lawsuit (Mar. 29, 2002), available at http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/
en/pressrelease /828 (noting that Edwin Black “does not demonstrate that I.B.M. bears some unique or decisive
responsibility for the evil that was done”). IBM was not the only reputable company that dealt with or supported the Nazi regime. See, e.g., Harold James, The Deutche Bank and the Nazi Economic War Against
the Jews (2001); see also Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben (1978).
63. The business judgment rule would insulate the agent from liability. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237
N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (finding that a court should not second guess a corporation’s decisions,
unless the decision involved fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest, even when those decisions resulted in a loss
of profits); see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733,
763–76 (2005) (“Despite contrary assertions by advocates of a profit-maximization duty, the law has never
barred corporations from sacrificing corporate profits to further public interest goals that are not required by
law.”).
64. See, e.g., Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780 (considering the “long run” economic interest of the corporation
in assessing a decision that could be construed to sacrifice profit).
65. Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 10, at 1083.
66. Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra note 59; see Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 13334 (40th ann. ed. 2002).
67. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
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stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.”68 But
few, if any, jurisdictions have announced such a seemingly unconditional rule of
shareholder primacy.69 The opinion is unique in this sense, explaining why this
1919 Michigan opinion is still prominent today. There is a novelty appeal to the
unusual.70 While the case is an obligatory citation for proponents of shareholder
primacy, Delaware most notably consistently has refused to articulate a clear shareholder mandate.71 Quite the contrary, Delaware law generally has considered the
corporation from an entity perspective, which conflicts with the law and economic
view that the firm is nothing more than a nexus of contracts.72 In fact, there is only
one Delaware opinion that discusses the “nexus of contracts” theory, and a fair
reading shows that it marginalizes the analytic importance of the prevailing law and
economic concept.73
It has been argued that the choice of corporate law “does not create substantial
third-party effects.”74 This argument strengthens the credibility of the contract metaphor and the application of the Coase Theorem.75 But the assertion that corporations, and thus the laws governing corporations, are essentially closed universes of
contracting parties is hard to accept.76 If indeed there are no or little third party
effects, much of the rationale for limited liability would be undermined. The parties to the contract can “negotiate” this point through the pricing mechanism.77 Yet,

68. Id. at 684.
69. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev.
247, 301 (1999) (noting that Dodge is “highly unusual”).
70. “A majority of states have adopted stakeholder statutes, which allow corporate directors to take the
interests of non-shareholder stakeholders into account when making decisions for the corporation.” Kent
Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 283, 291 n.33 (1998).
71. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (“[A] board of
directors . . . is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value . . . .”); see also Allen, Jacobs & Strine,
supra note 10, at 1067 (noting that Delaware law is “ambivalent” on the question of shareholder primacy).
72. See Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 10, at 1079 (noting that “Delaware law inclines toward the entity
model” to the extent that it gives boards substantial power to thwart takeovers); Strine, supra note 48, at 1176
(stating that “the entity model prevails”); see also Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150; Adolf A.
Berle, Jr., The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution 169 (1954) (noting that in corporate practice the
“argument has been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd’s contention”);
Stout, supra note 24, at 1204 (“Delaware courts seem to have come down rather firmly on Dodd’s side of the
Berle-Dodd debate.”).
73. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 195 n.75 (Del. Ch. 2006). The
Westlaw search term used was: (nexus /2 contracts). Another Delaware case came up in this search, but only
because it cites the title of a law review article. MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1126 n.5
(Del. 2003) (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 1
(2002)).
74. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 17.
75. See id. (“It is unimportant that [the terms of the contract] may not be ‘negotiated’; the pricing and
testing mechanisms are all that matter, as long as there are no effects on third parties. This should come as no
shock to anyone familiar with the Coase Theorem.”) (citing R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
Econ. 1 (1960)).
76. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
77. One can argue that limited liability would still be an efficient default rule for contracting parties.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Law and Economics 132–38 (2002). If such a default rule were effi-
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limited liability is the foundational concept of corporate law.78 While the benefits of
limited liability may include cost efficiency associated with contracting and monitoring as claimed by law and economic scholarship,79 no one disputes that limited
liability also externalizes some cost of profit generation.80 Additionally, there are of
course externalities for which the law provides no claim. In an era of globalization,
this is an important point since not all countries have a strong system of rights or
regulatory oversight. The law’s reluctance to adopt a narrow view of shareholder
primacy is rooted in the practical difficulty of separating ethical questions from
economic choices. The hard question on shareholder primacy is not a choice of
profit to shareholders or benefit to others,81 but is instead shareholder profit or
harm to others. Profit is not made in a vacuum; it always has an associated cost,
some of which is always externalized.
iii.
The theory of agency, the problem of ethical choice, and the profit maximization
norm are inextricably linked. The question remains whether the corporate form
cient, however, one would question the need for legal intervention in the contracting process. In other words,
sophisticated market participants (creditors and public companies) would adopt efficient terms. They would
agree on limited liability as a boilerplate credit term with little expenditure of transaction cost and would factor
in defaults through the cost of debt, as is the case now with limited liability. There are no obvious impediments
to bargaining among sophisticated market participants, and thus the case for legal intervention under the
application of the Coase Theorem is less obvious. Moreover, the capital market may be served by having a
variety of firms, some that contract for limited liability and others that do not, and each market participant
would identify the contractual arrangements that best suit his appetite for risk. Certainly, limited liability is
routinely contracted away in many corporate transactions involving small or closed corporations despite the
legal protection afforded to the corporate form. And, if risk aversion of retail shareholders and the need for
diversification are the concern, shareholders could invest through large institutional investment vehicles as is
largely the case now. Such investment would achieve superior diversification than any retail shareholder can
achieve by herself, and it would greatly minimize the risk of personal liability since a creditor can claim against
the assets of the institutional intermediary first (presumably the class of institutional shareholders would have
the funds to pay off any liability). Thus, a rule of personal liability would result in greater diversification and
mitigation of portfolio risk of the average retail shareholder. Lastly, even if personal liability poses a net increase in risk to retail shareholders, it may not be as risky as certain investment strategies they routinely
undertake—for example, undiversified “all in” investments in speculative ventures or highly levered personal
portfolio—and yet the law does not take a paternalistic approach or is even influenced by the fact that natural
persons tend to be risk averse. As we have learned from the recent problems with the housing and credit
markets, people take great financial risks in credit transactions, and they also manage catastrophic risks, such as
earthquakes and hurricanes, which are more likely to inflict financial devastation than personal liability
through investment in a public company. At the end of the day, it is an empirical matter whether the potential
financial catastrophe of personal liability is qualitatively different or quantitatively higher than other routinely
accepted types of financial catastrophe that can befall any natural person.
78. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 40 (“Limited liability is a distinguishing feature of corporate law—perhaps the distinguishing feature.”).
79. See id. at 40–62 (providing economic analysis of limited liability).
80. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Bainbridge, supra note 77, at 134 (“Limited liability
thus generates negative externalities by creating incentives for shareholders to cause the company to invest in
higher risk projects than would the firm’s creditors.”).
81. See, e.g., Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991) (considering the propriety of a substantial corporate charitable donation to a museum).
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can promote unethical choice. Here, again, Coase’s conception of the firm is relevant. Despite the emphasis on contractual relationships, Coase also viewed the firm
as having a central control: “A firm, therefore, consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on
an entrepreneur.”82 While this command-and-control aspect of the firm has been
criticized,83 hierarchical management is the operating paradigm of public companies.84 In a complex enterprise, such as a public company, there is no credible way
to eliminate the need for a chief executive, divisional heads, group managers, and
so forth, all of whom ultimately report to the board of directors.85
The hierarchical nature of a corporation presents a structural problem in ethics.
Although the firm is cost efficient, as Coase showed, the structure is susceptible to
distortions in moral deliberation. It tends to diffuse personal responsibility and to
create conflicts with one’s ethical standard in weighing competing values. In short,
the firm structure changes the behavior of the actors within and thus produces
results that are different than had they acted independently. To see this problem,
we step back, away from economic theory, and see how philosophers, social scientists, and legal scholars have perceived the problem of moral choice within social
structures.
The philosopher Hannah Arendt asked how ordinary people can behave immorally.86 The subject of her philosophical examination was Adolf Eichmann, who was
responsible for the transportation and logistics needed to execute the Holocaust.87
Like many ordinary people, Eichmann was married, had a family, wanted to do
well in his profession,88 and professed to have lived by a well-defined moral system.89 He was not a “monster” in the sense of some obvious psychological defect or
abnormality,90 but was a rather “normal” person.91 How then could such a person
participate in such enormity?
82. Coase, supra note 11, at 393.
83. See, e.g., Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure:
Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1123, 1130 (2007) (“Coase’s explanation,
however, relies on a very narrow understanding of firm organization—one that assumes the entrepreneur
exercises fiat control. Coase uncritically adopts this view of firm hierarchy by generalizing from nineteenth
century conceptions of the relation between employer and employee.”).
84. “Given the shareholder-management divide, the autocratic-CEO paradigm appears to be the only arrangement that allows for the effective functioning of a corporation.” Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence 436 (2007).
85. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2008).
86. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (Penguin Books 1976) (1963).
87. See id. at 153.
88. Professional advancement and recognition were most important to Eichmann. Id. at 43–44, 62.
89. Eichmann claimed to have lived his life under Kantian moral principles, leading Arendt to observe that
Eichmann had a capacity for self-deception and inconsistency that made him appear to be a “clown.” Id. at 54,
135–37.
90. Id. at 54.
91. The assessment was based on psychological examinations. Id. at 25–26. To this assessment, Arendt
added: “Behind the comedy of the soul experts lay the hard fact that his was obviously no case of moral let
alone legal insanity.” Id. at 26.
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Arendt observed that the bureaucratic apparatus of the political machine allowed
a process of moral proxy where Eichmann delegated his moral authority.92 She
observed that Eichmann not only obeyed the law, but felt compelled to act consistent with the social norms that laid the foundation of that law.93 His sole motivation was to do well in his given job and to advance within the organization.94 By
himself, he was incapable of committing the crimes,95 certainly not with his own
hands or with sole power to set policy, but within the organization he was capable
of participating in horrific action. His fatal defect was a “lack of imagination” and
“sheer thoughtlessness,”96 traits that are not extraordinary, but rather common. In
Arendt’s final analysis, the cause of Eichmann’s actions was the “stupidity” of a man
who, motivated to do his job well and to achieve the ends set by the socio-legal
environment of the time and place, failed to think and see the consequences of his
actions.97 Thus, in a controversial conclusion, Arendt characterized the man and
the crime as “the banality of evil.”98
Like Arendt, the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre argued that institutions of
modern society create a “moral and cultural distance” between action and consequence.99 Reflecting on the specific problem of corporate malfeasance, he observed
that “large corporations are collectively quite willing to undertake courses of action
The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither
perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal. From the viewpoint of our legal institutions and of our moral standards of judgment, this normality was much
more terrifying than all the atrocities put together, for it implied—as had been said at Nuremberg
over and over again by the defendants and their counsels—that this new type of criminal, who is in
actual fact hostis generis humani [enemy of mankind], commits his crimes under circumstances that
make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel that he is doing wrong.
Id. at 276.
92. See id. at 114 (“[T]he élite of the good old Civil Service were vying and fighting with each other for the
honor of taking the lead in these ‘bloody’ matters. ‘At that moment, I sensed a kind of Pontius Pilate feeling,
for I felt free of all guilt.’ Who was he to judge? Who was he ‘to have [his] own thoughts in this matter’? Well, he
was neither the first nor the last to be ruined by modesty.”); see also id. at 116 (“As Eichmann told it, the most
potent factor in the soothing of his own conscience was the simple fact that he could see no one, no one at all,
who actually was against the Final Solution.”); id. at 126 (“He did not need to ‘close his ears to the voice of
conscience,’ as the judgment has it, not because he had none, but because his conscience spoke with a ‘respectable voice,’ with the voice of respectable society around him.”).
93. See id. at 137 (“Much of the horribly painstaking thoroughness in the execution of the Final Solution—a thoroughness that usually strikes the observer as typically German, or else as characteristic of the
perfect bureaucrat—can be traced to the odd notion, indeed very common in Germany, that to be law-abiding
means not merely to obey the laws but to act as though one were the legislator of the laws that one obeys.”).
94. See id. at 287 (“Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal advancement, he
had no motives at all.”).
95. See id. (“And this diligence in itself was in no way criminal; he certainly would never have murdered
his superior in order to inherit his post.”).
96. See id. at 47–48 (“[A] more specific, and also more decisive, flaw in Eichmann’s character was his
almost total inability ever to look at anything from the other fellow’s point of view.”).
97. See id. at 287. In this sense, Arendt famously, and controversially, observed that on a strictly factual
level there was a “banality of evil.” Id.
98. Id.
99. The Ford Pinto Case, supra note 6, at 283.
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that individuals in the corporation would be deeply shocked by if it was proposed
that they as individuals should do what the corporation does.”100 Such intermediation interferes with ordinary moral deliberation. Human beings are not perfectly
deliberative. Moral assessment becomes more opaque as responsibility is diffused
and as the distance between action and consequence becomes greater. The combination of corporate power and moral weakness endangers the concept of individual
responsibility.101 Thus, the problem of corporate ethics is not reducible to the autonomous person.
The question of moral choice has not been limited to a philosophical inquiry.
Like Arendt and MacIntyre, the psychologist Stanley Milgram inquired into the
question of how ordinary people can obey immoral orders.102 In a classic series of
experiments, he asked volunteer participants (“teachers”) to administer electric
shocks to test subjects (“learners”) in an experiment purportedly designed to study
the effect of punishment on learning.103 As the learners failed to perform properly,
the teachers were instructed to increase the level of electricity.104 The level of shock
ranged up to dangerous and fatal levels.105 The experiment was a ruse, and the real
subjects were the “teachers” who were required by the constraints of the experiment
to administer electric shocks.106 The experiments showed that participants went far
beyond the predicted behavior, and many subjects, despite reservation and discomfort, ultimately obeyed orders of the experimenter to give highly painful or dangerous levels of electric shock.107
Milgram’s findings are consistent with Arendt’s philosophical conclusion on the
nature of evil.108 Milgram identified two crucial factors in the subject’s deliberative
process: hierarchical structure and agency.109 First, hierarchical structures, like
those found in corporations, tend to suppress the psychological and moral controls
of autonomous persons.110 Second, agency brings about an “agentic state,” wherein
“the person entering an authority system no longer views himself as acting out of
his own purposes but rather comes to see himself as an agent for executing the

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (1974). Like Arendt’s work, his
work was inspired in part by a desire to underst the Holocaust. Id. at 1–2.
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 3–4.
107. Id. at 4–5.
108. See id. at 5 (summarizing that his and other studies find over and over again the “extreme willingness
of adults to go to almost any lengths on the command of an authority . . . .” (emphasis added)).
109. Id. at 129–133.
110. See id. at 129 (“More generally, whenever elements that function autonomously are brought into a
system of hierarchical coordination, changes are required in the internal structure of the elements. These
changes constitute the system requirements, and they invariably entail some suppression of local control in the
interest of system coherence.”).
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wishes of another person.”111 In short, an autonomous person behaves differently
when he is in a subordinate agency role, and under these conditions he “no longer
regards himself as responsible for his actions.”112
Arendt, MacIntyre and Milgram’s inquiries sought the causes of extraordinary
events like the Holocaust and ordinary malfeasance like the flawed cost-benefit
analysis used in the production of the Ford Pinto. Of course, the scale between the
enormity of the Holocaust and everyday externalities imparted by corporations is
incomparable. But the lesson is the same: “the bureaucratic pattern of organization
that fragments the knowledge required for moral decisionmaking is common to
large institutions throughout contemporary society.”113 The insights of Arendt,
MacIntyre and Milgram are important to the problem of corporate ethics.114
Legal scholars also have recognized the problem of moral proxy. David Luban,
Alan Strudler, and David Wasserman argued that bureaucratic organizations can
inhibit proper moral deliberation.
Bureaucratic organizations parcel out morally significant knowledge among
various individuals along the same lines as organizational tasks. The division
of labor is equally a division of knowledge. Supervisors may not know of
wrongful actions by subordinates implementing management decisions, while
subordinates may believe they have been left no discretion and no alternatives.
Put these conditions together and you have a recipe for organizational wrongdoing that will never trouble the conscience of anyone within the organization.
Individuals within the organization do not know, or perhaps do not want to
know, what their actions add up to.115
While most moral theories emphasize the autonomy of the moral agent—just as
the economic theory of the firm emphasizes autonomous choice of contracting
parties—there is insufficient focus on the roles of diffuse responsibility, limited
knowledge, and agency.116 The authors concluded that “the corporate structure may
111. Id. at 133.
112. Id. at xii. This was precisely Arendt’s conclusion on how Eichmann justified his actions. See supra note
91 and accompanying text.
113. Luban, Strudler & Wasserman, supra note 34, at 2359.
114. See id. 2358–62 (citing Arendt’s observations on the Holocaust and Milgram’s works on obedience to
argue that corporate structures can promote immoral choices); see also Douglas Litowitz, Are Corporations
Evil?, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 811, 836–37 (2004) (arguing that Arendt’s concept of the “banality of evil” is
applicable to the corporate context).
115. Luban, Strudler & Wasserman, supra note 34, at 2355. “In every human group there is less reason to
guide and to check impulse, less capacity for self-transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs of others
and therefore more unrestrained egoism than the individuals, who compose the group, reveal in their personal
relationships.” Id. at 2358 (quoting Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society xi–xii (rev. ed.
1960)).
116. Id. at 2363; see also John M. Darley & Bibb Latané, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of
Responsibility, 8 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 377 (1968) (analyzing the failure to rescue by neighbors in
the Kitty Genovese murder). This problem is not simply a moral problem, but also a legal problem. American
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be a locus of events causally relevant to morally significant harm” and that
“[o]rganizations are real and irreducible to their component individuals.”117
Similarly, John Coffee argued that moral choices are not so clear in the trenches
of corporate management.118 It is the unusual case that top executives of a firm will
instruct subordinates to engage in patently wrong deeds.119 In this regard, the type
of frauds that took place in Enron, Tyco and WorldCom are atypical. Unethical
behavior typically arises from ambiguous situations, when information may be imperfect and responsibility may be diffused. In these circumstances, individuals may
set aside their personal morals and act on behalf of the perceived good of the firm
or group.120 Often, there are conflicting value systems that create ambiguity where
there would otherwise be none. From this perspective, it is understandable that the
locus of corporate misdeeds is “predominately at the lower to middle management
level.”121 Normal people, doing ordinary jobs, are susceptible to unethical conduct
as a result of their agency and organizational dynamics.122
Filtered through corporate intermediation, an ethical dilemma is no longer simply subject to an autonomous person’s moral compass, which presumably does not
significantly vary between principals and agents in the absence of the corporate
form. Not only does an ethical dilemma present a conflict between the interests of
agent and principal (the primary focus of economists and legal scholars), but also
between the interests of principal and noncontractual constituents. The profit maximization norm simplifies decisionmaking in ethical dilemmas. It provides the legitimizing principle to resolve the conflict, thus allowing agents to avoid personal
accountability. It creates the social condition in which managers delegate their
moral authority to a greater institutional purpose, a sort of moral proxy from managers to an abstractized, simplified version of the shareholder’s interest. As Coffee
observed, the corporate agent who engages in wrong “has not breached the stockholders’ trust, but instead is faithfully pursuing their desires” when considered in
the context of the profit maximization norm.123 “The market in effect demands

tort law does not recognize a general duty to rescue. See, e.g., Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959).
Given the potential diffusion of responsibility in a rescue situation, a workable rule is difficult to formulate. See
Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative
Obligations, 72 Va. L. Rev. 879, 933–34 (1986).
117. Luban, Strudler & Wasserman, supra note 34, at 2377.
118. See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem
of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386, 395–97 (1981).
119. See id. at 397 (noting that “corporate crime is predominantly [committed] at the lower to middle
management level”).
120. See id. at 396–97.
121. Id. at 397.
122. See, e.g., The Ford Pinto Case, supra note 6, at 112 (arguing that organizational culture “amounts to
a collection of scripts,” which not only alters perceptions of issues but also actions); see also John Z. De Lorean
& J. Patrick Wright, How Moral Men Make Immoral Decisions—A Look Inside GM, in The Big Business
Reader: Essays on Corporate America 36 (Mark Green & Robert Massie, Jr. eds., 1980) (arguing that the
corporation organizational form clouds the complex decision-making in ethical dilemmas).
123. Coffee, supra note 118, at 418.
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misconduct, and the manager responds to that demand out of a fear that otherwise
the marketplace will discount the value of his firm’s shares.”124 In this narrow, ruthless version of the shareholder primacy norm, the ethical dilemma ultimately boils
down to a cost-benefit with wealth as the end.
The problem of agency and its cost is broader than what the prevailing view of
the firm suggests. Agency cost typically arises when the interest of the agent and
principal are not aligned.125 But when the alignment of interests becomes closer in
the context of an ethical dilemma, cost in the form of foregone profit also results.
Ultimately, how profit sacrifice is considered depends on a normative view of
whether the agent should advance the principal’s wealth or utility. If the latter,
there is room in the theory of agency cost to accommodate ethical deliberation
without having profit sacrifice be characterized as residual loss.126 An unconditional
rule of profit maximization is unrealistic. A better rule is to apply a variable standard: a rule allowing the agent to take a best guess as to what the principal would
do if the process of informed consent was costless.127 In most cases, this rule and
the profit maximization norm are one and the same. In difficult circumstances,
however, the rule provides better approximation of the principal’s interests because
it mitigates the distorting effects of the corporate form on individual action.
iv.
When thinking about the theory of the firm and the problem of corporate ethics,
we must distinguish the instrumental legal question from the broader policy construct. As an instrumental matter, whether agents are under a duty to maximize
profit is of little practical relevance. Empirical observation suggests that corporations exist because they create wealth, but the shareholder primacy norm, in
whatever form given by corporate agents, is unenforceable.128 Agents have enormous discretion to conduct business as they see fit.129 Agents must always maintain
a strong profit motive to ensure economic viability, and the market forces of execu-

124. Id. at 418–19. Indeed, law and economics scholars have argued that violation of the law is acceptable
so long as wealth is maximized:
But what is the source of management’s duty? If managers act on behalf of shareholders, the duty
must come from a need to prevent injury to these shareholders. If a given act involves a violation of
law, penalties may follow. Managers’ duty calls for them to minimize the sum of penalty costs and
the cost of compliance with the rule.
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender
Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1192 (1981).
125. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 55.
127. Indeed, as an analytic device, a hypothesized dialogue is consistent with contract principles. See
Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 537 N.E.2d 176, 179 (N.Y. 1989) (“[T]he common sense rule to apply is to
consider what the parties would have concluded had they considered the subject.”).
128. See supra notes 58–73 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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tive labor and corporate control ensure a healthy degree of fidelity to that end.130
One would be hard pressed to find a director or executive of a public company who
did not try to make profit or “win” the competitive game of business. With that
said, it is also fact that within the contours of these broad constraints the shareholder primacy norm is malleable to the agent’s broad discretion. The business
judgment rule provides broad cover to an agent’s action, whether motivated by a
desire to benefit the principal or some other reason.131 In most cases, profit sacrifice
is legally unassailable,132 and a legal duty to maximize profit would be an unworkable rule and ultimately unenforceable.133
In the debate on corporate ethics, theory has a close connection to practice. The
normative end of corporate law can legitimize or not conduct that sacrifices shareholder profit for some other social value. The continuing debate on Sarbanes-Oxley
focuses on the cost-benefit of the regulatory scheme,134 but beneath the dollars and
cents of the matter is a deep philosophical debate not only on the immediate question of regulation of corporate governance, but also on the role of law in regulating
individual behavior and ethics.135 Beyond the specifics of regulation, the legal
framework and theory provides the contextual circumstance of the ethical dilemma. As Stephen Bainbridge noted, the broad concepts of the firm have “more of
a psychological than a legal impact” and affect management’s “socialization” rather
than its legal obligations.136
This point is illustrated by a personal classroom experience. In the fall of 2006, I
taught Torts and Business Associations (“BA”) in the same semester. An intuition
crossed my mind: do my students in Torts and BA think about the costs of acci130. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110, 112 (1965).
According to Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s team production theory, no one monitors the board of directors.
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board,
79 Wash. U. L.Q. 403, 421 (2001) (“[I]t is essential that the hierarch remain free from the command and
control of any of the team members.”). Instead, “economic pressures” constrain the board. Id. at 438.
131. Indeed, it is apparent that the justifications for many corporate actions, which withstand legal scrutiny,
are questionable. This may be a cynical view, but I do not think so. It is simply recognition that there is a
distinction between the legal standard of pleading and evidence, and an unrestricted probabilistic assessment
based on the known facts.
132. See, e.g., Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 815 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 387 N.Y.S.2d
993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976). In Kamin, accounting profit and perhaps short-term stock price was enhanced,
though the board’s decision diminished the true economic value of the firm.
133. See Elhauge, supra note 63, at 770 (“In any event, even if the duty of care did nominally require profitmaximization, the business judgment rule makes plain that the duty of care cannot be enforced in a way that
would bar managers from exercising discretion to sacrifice corporate profits in the public interest.”).
134. See Greenspan, supra note 84, at 430–31 (“[F]ew in the business community would argue that the
cost and effort of implementing Section 404. . . [has] created a net plus for either their company or the U.S.
economy as a whole.”).
135. Consider, for example, Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley, which requires that CEOs and CFOs certify the
accuracy of financial statements. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350(a) (West 2008). The aim of this provision is to impart a
sense of greater personal responsibility with appropriate sanction. Such mandatory nature of an agent’s duty of
care towards financial statement accuracy is in tension with Delaware law, which allows a corporation to opt
out of certain duties. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2008).
136. Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 1440–41.
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dents in the context of a business decision in the same way? A simple, informal
survey was devised to test the intuition. The students were presented with a classic
cost-benefit problem, modeled off the Ford Pinto case, and were asked to decide
how they would resolve the problem.137 The problem stated that the manufacturing
cost of fixing a fuel liner was $113 million more than the total liability cost, but not
fixing the liner would result in 450 additional cases of deaths and serious injuries.
The students were presented with a binary choice of dollars or lives. Each class was
split into two groups: one group was asked to assume the role of a sole owner of
the business, and the others were told to assume they were the chief executive of a
company with many shareholders.138 Each student was asked to read the problem,
and to anonymously submit their decision in writing.
The results were interesting. Students in Torts did not differentiate between their
roles as principal and agent: 10% of sole owners chose to save manufacturing costs,
while 11% of chief executives did the same. Students in BA, however, perceived the
problem differently: 18% of sole owners decided to save manufacturing costs, while
24% of chief executives did the same.139
Since this was not a formal repeated experiment, I certainly draw no hard conclusions from these results. The survey was more in nature of an anonymous straw
poll. The results, however, strengthen an initial intuition and the thoughts developed in this Article.140 A couple of points are worth noting. First, third-year students were more willing to engage in traditional cost-benefit analysis. By this time,
most of them would have been exposed to the concept, for example, of the Hand
Formula.141 Second, the cost-benefit analysis was based on the measure of wealth.
My guess is that if the students engaged in a cost-benefit analysis from the perspective of welfare, several would probably have arrived at a different conclusion.142
Third, third-year students seem to distinguish between the roles of principal and

137. The experiment was conducted before teaching United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d
Cir. 1947), and Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
138. Each group was separated during the exercise so that students were unaware of the experiment
variable.
139. The breakdowns for the Torts students were: single owners (4/40), and chief executive (4/35). The
breakdowns for the BA students were: single owners (6/34), and chief executive (8/34). Only a few students in
each group swung the results, but this is expected. As economists warn, the difference in behaviors frequently
occurs at the margins. Because the opportunity to conduct the survey again has not presented itself, one should
be careful not to overstate the results. The number of participating students was limited (143 students in total),
who were divided into smaller groups (34–40 students). There is the possibility that they could just be random
variations, and thus the numbers should be taken with a grain of salt. With that said, large swings in numbers
were not expected, and changes were expected to be seen on the margins.
140. A post-exercise debriefing with students would have been helpful, but this would have breached
anonymity.
141. See Carrroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173 (“[I]f the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the
burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL.”).
142. See generally Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis
(2006) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis should have a moral foundation based on human welfare
considerations).
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agent, whereas first year students did not. Here, again, with legal training students
would have learned to put aside personal points of view and mores and to assume
the role of an agent. Lastly, third-year students were closer to being a lawyer than a
layperson, and first year students were closer to being a layperson than a lawyer. I
do not suggest a substantive judgment here on the ethics of the situation, only the
observation that the decision of a person with conflicting values produced different
outcomes. Even in this simple exercise, we can see how law students learn to adopt
the agent’s role and the obligations of that role are set forth by the prevailing legal
standards and economic norms.
Agency matters when choices involve ethical dilemmas. Since agency relationships are fiduciary, the characterization of corporate managers as agents lends a
veneer of moral authority to the profit maximization norm.143 It is interesting that
ethical concepts are routinely discussed in the ordinary course of business school
curriculum and scholarship.144 “In contrast, the legal academy tends to avoid direct
mention of business ethics, even though the subject matter overlaps.”145 The concern is the possibility of regulatory overreaching in matters of behavior.146 But it is
also true that corporate law has an ethical foundation, and the debate on values
and their order necessarily affect the behavior of agents. My own takeaway from the
above classroom exercise is that regardless of how the law and legal education try to
shy away from deontological inquiries, the questions of ethics in business conduct
is inevitable and whatever answer is given, whether wealth is the supreme value or
conditional to some other thing, it provides the foundation of corporate law.
v.
To conclude, the problem of corporate ethics is profound. Corporations continue
to evolve and, quite likely, grow in power and influence with the advent of consolidation and globalization. The day-to-day decisions of a business manager routinely
have a moral component: Should the firm engage in a merger or acquisition transaction that would require massive layoffs? Should it spend more to ensure a cleaner
environment or better working conditions when positive law would not require it?
Should it provide safer products when the cost-benefit analysis suggests that liability would be cheaper? Should it submit to a government’s demand to limit privacy
or access to information as a condition of market entry? Should it take action that
mitigates the tragedy of the commons such as global warming? The choices and
actions of agents depend on the presuppositions: whether wealth maximization is a
better default standard, and whether profit sacrifice is consistent with shareholder
143. Bratton, supra note 20, at 1451.
144. Id. at 1453. For example, the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania has an academic
department and curriculum dedicated to business and market ethics. See Wharton, Legal Studies and Business
Ethics, http://lgst.wharton.upenn.edu/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
145. Bratton, supra note 20, at 1453.
146. Id. at 1454.

vol. 3 no. 2 2008

1123

\\server05\productn\M\MLB\3-2\MLB211.txt

unknown

Seq: 24

4-APR-08

8:53

Corporate Ethics, Agency, and the Theory of the Firm
preference. The economic theories of the firm and agency cannot be devoid of
ethical considerations for they have significant impact on how managers, who
wield concentrated economic power, conceive their roles. Lastly, they have significant influence on the formulation of the rules of law, such as the business judgment rule, limited liability, takeover defenses, and shareholder democracy.
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